Label Universal Targeted Attack by Akhtar, Naveed et al.
Label Universal Targeted Attack
Naveed Akhtar*, Mohammad A. A. K. Jalwana*, Mohammed Bennamoun, Ajmal Mian
*The authors contributed equally, and claim joint first authorship.
Department of Computer Science and Software Engineering
University of Western Australia
35 Stirling Highway, CRAWLEY 6009, WA.
{naveed.akhtar@,mohammad.jalwana@research.,mohammed.bennamoun@,ajmal.mian@}uwa.edu.au
Abstract
We introduce Label Universal Targeted Attack (LUTA) that makes a deep model
predict a label of attacker’s choice for ‘any’ sample of a given source class with high
probability. Our attack stochastically maximizes the log-probability of the target
label for the source class with first order gradient optimization, while accounting
for the gradient moments. It also suppresses the leakage of attack information
to the non-source classes for avoiding the attack suspicions. The perturbations
resulting from our attack achieve high fooling ratios on the large-scale ImageNet
and VGGFace models, and transfer well to the Physical World. Given full control
over the perturbation scope in LUTA, we also demonstrate it as a tool for deep
model autopsy. The proposed attack reveals interesting perturbation patterns and
observations regarding the deep models.
1 Introduction
Adversarial examples [1] are carefully manipulated inputs that appear natural to humans but cause
deep models to misbehave. Recent years have seen multiple methods to generate manipulative signals
(i.e. perturbations) for fooling deep models on individual input samples [1], [2], [3] or a large number
of samples with high probability [4], [5] - termed ‘universal’ perturbations. The former sometimes
also launch ‘targeted’ attacks, where the model ends up predicting a desired target label for the input
adversarial example. The existence of adversarial examples is being widely perceived as a threat to
deep learning [6]. Nevertheless, given appropriate control over the underlying manipulative signal,
adversarial examples may also serve as empirical tools for analyzing deep models.
This work introduces a technique to generate manipulative signals that can essentially fool a deep
model to confuse ‘an entire class label’ with another label of choice. The resulting Label Universal
Targeted Attack (LUTA)1 is of high relevance in practical settings. It allows pre-computed pertur-
bations that can change an object’s category or a person’s identity for a deployed model on-the-fly,
where the attacker has also the freedom to choose the target label, and there is no particular constraint
over the input. Moreover, the convenient control over the manipulative signal in LUTA encourages
the fresh perspective of seeing adversarial examples as model analysis tools. Controlling the pertur-
bation scope to individual classes reveals insightful patterns and meaningful information about the
classification regions learned by the deep models.
The proposed LUTA is an iterative algorithm that performs a stochastic gradient-based optimization
to maximize the log-probability of the target class prediction for the perturbed source class. It also
inhibits fooling of the model on non-source classes to mitigate suspicions about the attack. The
algorithm performs careful adaptive learning of the perturbation parameters based on their first
1The source code is provided here. LUTA is intended to be eventually incorporated in public attack libraries,
e.g. foolbox [7].
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and second moments. This paper explores three major variants of LUTA. The first two bound the
perturbations in `∞ and `2 norms, whereas the third allows unbounded perturbations to freely explore
the classification regions of the target model. Extensive experiments for fooling VGG-16 [8], ResNet-
50 [9], Inception-V3 [10], MobileNet-V2 [11] on ImageNet dataset [12] and ResNet-50 on large-scale
VGG-Face2 dataset [13] ascertain the effectiveness of our attack. The attack is also demonstrated in
the Physical World. The unbound LUTA variant is shown to reveal interesting perturbation patterns
and insightful observations regarding deep model classification regions.
2 Prior art
Adversarial attacks is currently a highly active research direction. For a comprehensive review, we
refer to [6]. Here, we discuss the key contributions that relate to this work more closely.
Szegedy et al. [1] were the first to report the vulnerability of modern deep learning to adversarial
attacks. They showed the possibility of altering images with imperceptible additive perturbations
to fool deep models. Goodfellow et al. [2] later proposed the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
to efficiently estimate such perturbations. FGSM computes the desired signal using the sign of the
network’s cost function gradient w.r.t the input image. The resulting perturbation performs a one-step
gradient ascent over the network loss for the input. Instead of a single step, Kurakin et al. [14] took
multiple small steps for more effective perturbations. They additionally proposed to take steps in the
direction that maximizes the prediction probability of the least-likely class for the image. Madry et
al. [15] noted that the ‘projected gradient descent on the negative loss function’ strategy adopted by
Kurakin et al. results in highly effective attacks. DeepFool [3] is another popular attack that computes
perturbations iteratively by linearizing the model’s decision boundaries near the input images.
For the above, the domain of the computed perturbation is restricted to a single image. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [4] introduced an image-agnostic perturbation to fool a model into misclassifying ‘any’
image. Similar ‘universal’ adversarial perturbations are also computed in [16], [17]. These attacks
are non-targeted, i.e. the adversarial input is allowed to be misclassified into any class. Due to their
broader domain, universal perturbations are able to reveal interesting geometric correlations among
the decision boundaries of the deep models [4], [18]. However, both the perturbation domain and
the model prediction remain unconstrained for the universal perturbations. Manipulative signals are
expected to be more revealing with appropriate scoping at those ends. This motivates the need of our
label-universal attack that provides control over the source and target labels for model fooling. Such
an attack has also high practical relevance, because it enables the attacker to conveniently manipulate
the semantics learned by a deep model in an unrestricted manner.
3 Problem formulation
In line with the main stream of research in adversarial attacks, this work considers natural images as
the data and model domain. However, the proposed attack is generic under white-box settings.
Let = ∈ Rd denote the distribution of natural images, and ‘`’ be the label of its random sample
I`
rand∼ =. Let C(.) be the classifier that maps C(I`) → ` with high probability. We restrict the
classifier to be a deep neural network with cross-entropy loss. To fool C(.), we seek a perturbation
ρ ∈ Rd that satisfies the following constraint:
P
I`∼=
(
C(I` + ρ)→ `target : `target 6= `
)
≥ ζ s.t. ||ρ||p ≤ η, (1)
where ‘`target’ is the target label we want C(.) to predict for I` with probability ‘ζ’ or higher, ‘η’
controls the `p-norm of the perturbation, which is denoted by ||.||p. In the above constraint, the same
perturbation must fool the classifier on all samples of the source class (labelled ‘`’) with probability
≥ ζ. At the same time, ‘`target’ can be any label that is known to C(.). This formulation inspires the
name Label Universal Targeted Attack.
Allowing ‘`target’ to be a random label while ignoring the label of the input generalizes Eq. (1) to
the universal perturbation constraint [4]. On the other end, restricting I` to a single image results
in an image-specific targeted attack. In that case, the notion of probability can be ignored. In the
spectrum of adversarial attacks forming special cases of Eq. (1), other intermediate choices may
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include expanding the input domain to a few classes, or using multiple target labels for fooling.
Whereas these alternates are not our focus, our algorithm is readily extendable to these cases.
4 Computing the perturbation
We compute the perturbations for Label Universal Targeted Attack (LUTA) as shown in Algorithm 1.
The abstract concept of the algorithm is intuitive. For a given source class, we compute the desired
perturbation by taking small steps over the model’s cost surface in the directions that increase the
log-probability of the target label for the source class. The directions are computed stochastically,
and the steps are only taken in the trusted regions that are governed by the first and (raw) second
moment estimates of the directions. While computing a direction, we ensure that it also suppresses
the prediction of non-source classes as the target class. To bound the perturbation norm, we keep
projecting the accumulated signal to the `p-ball of the desired norm at each iteration. The text below
sequentially explains each step of the algorithm in detail. Henceforth, we alternatively refer to the
proposed algorithm as LUTA.
Algorithm 1 Label Universal Targeted Attack
Input: Classifier C, source class samples S , non-source class samples S , target label `target, perturba-
tion norm η, mini-batch size b, fooling ratio ζ.
Output: Targeted label universal perturbation ρ ∈ Rd.
1: Initialize ρ0, υ0, ω0 to zero vectors in Rd and t = 0. Set β1 = 0.9, and β2 = 0.999.
2: while fooling ratio < ζ do
3: Ss rand∼ S, So rand∼ S : |Ss| = |So| = b2 / get random samples from the source and other classes
4: Ss ← Clip (Ss 	 ρt), So ← Clip (So 	 ρt) / perturb and clip samples with the current estimate
5: t← t+ 1 / increment
6: δ ←
E
si∈Ss
[||∇siJ (si,`target)||2]
E
si∈So
[||∇siJ (si,`)||2] / compute scaling factor for gradient normalization
7: ξt ← 12
(
E
si∈Ss
[∇siJ (si, `target)]+ δ E
si∈So
[∇siJ (si, `)]) / compute Expected gradient
8: υt ← β1υt−1 + (1− β1)ξt / first moment estimate
9: ωt ← β2ωt−1 + (1− β2)(ξt  ξt) / raw second moment estimate
10: ρ←
√
1−βt2
1−βt1 diag
(
diag(
√
ωt)
−1υt
)
/ bias corrected moment ratio
11: ρt ← ρt−1 + ρ||ρ||∞ / update perturbation
12: ρt ← Ψ(ρt) / project on `p ball
13: end while
14: return
Due to its white-box nature, LUTA expects the target classifier as one of its inputs. It also requires a
set S of the source class samples, and a set S that contains samples of the non-source classes. Other
input parameters include the desired `p-norm ‘η’ of the perturbation, target label ‘`target’, mini-batch
size ‘b’ for the underlying stochastic optimization, and the desired fooling ratio ‘ζ’ - defined as the
percentage of the source class samples predicted as the target class instances.
We momentarily defer the discussion on hyper-parameters ‘β1’ and ‘β2’ on line 1 of the algorithm.
In a given iteration, LUTA first constructs sets Ss and So by randomly sampling the source and
non-source classes, respectively. The cardinality of these sets is fixed to ‘ b2 ’ to keep the mini-batch
size to ‘b’ (line 3). Each element of both sets is then perturbed with the current estimate of the
perturbation - operation denoted by symbol 	 on line 4. The chosen symbol emphasizes that ρt is
subtracted in our algorithm from all the samples to perturb them. The ‘Clip(.)’ function clips the
perturbed samples to its valid range, [0, 255] in our case of 8-bit image representation.
Lemma 4.1: For C(.) with cross-entropy cost J (θ, s, `), the log-probability of s classified as ‘`’
increases in the direction − ∇sJ (θ,s,`)||∇sJ (θ,s,`)||∞ , where θ denotes the model parameters2.
Proof: We can write J (θ, s, `) = − log (P(`|s)) for C(.). Linearizing the cost and inverting the
2The model parameters remain fixed throughout, hence we ignore θ in Algorithm 1 and its description.
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sign, the log-probability maximizes along γ = − ∇sJ (θ, s, `). With ||γ||∞ = maxi |γi|, `∞-
normalization re-scales γ in the same direction of increasing log (P(`|s)).
Under Lemma 4.1, LUTA strives to take steps along the cost function’s gradient w.r.t. an input si.
Since the domain of si spans multiple samples in our case, we must take steps along the ‘Expected’
direction of those samples. However, it has to be ensured that the computed direction is not too
generic to also cause log-probability rise for the irrelevant (i.e. non-source class) samples. From
the practical view point, perturbations causing samples of ‘any’ class to be misclassified into the
target class are less interesting, and can easily raise suspicions. Moreover, they also compromise our
control over the perturbation scope, which is not desired. To refrain from general fooling directions,
we nudge the computed direction such that it also inhibits the fooling of non-source class samples.
Lines 6 and 7 of the algorithm implement these steps as follows.
On line 6, we estimate the ratio between the Expected norms of the source sample gradients and
the non-source sample gradients. Notice that we compute the respective gradients using different
prediction labels. In the light of Lemma 4.1, ∇siJ (si, `target) : si ∈ Ss gives us the direction
(ignoring the negative sign) for fooling a model into predicting label ‘`target’ for si, where the sample
is from the source class. On the other hand, ∇siJ (si, `) : si ∈ So provides the direction that
improves the model confidence on the correct prediction of si, where the sample is from non-source
class. The diverse nature of the computed gradients can result in significant difference between their
norms. The scaling factor ‘δ’ on line 6 is computed to account for that difference in the subsequent
steps. For the tth iteration, we compute the Expected gradient ξt of our mini-batch on line 7. At this
point, it is worth noting that the effective mini-batch for the underlying stochastic optimization in
LUTA comprises clipped samples in the set Ss
⋃So. The vector ξt is computed as the weighted
average of the Expected gradients of the source and non-source samples. Under the linearity of the
Expectation operator and preservation of the vector direction with scaling, it is straightforward to
see that ξt encodes the Expected direction to achieve the targeted fooling of the source samples into
the label ‘`target’, while inhibiting the fooling of non-source samples by increasing their prediction
confidence for their correct classes.
Owing to the diversity of the samples in its mini-batch, LUTA steps in the direction of computed
gradient cautiously. On line 8 and line 9, it respectively estimates the first and the raw second
moment (i.e. un-centered variance) of the computed gradient using exponential moving averages.
The hyper-parameters ‘β1’ and ‘β2’ decide the decay rates of these averages, whereas  denotes
the Hadamard product. The use of moving averages as the moment estimates in LUTA is inspired
by the Adam algorithm [19] that efficiently performs stochastic optimization. However, instead of
using the moving averages of gradients to update the parameters (i.e. model weights) as in [19], we
compute those for the Expected gradient and capitalize on the directions for perturbation estimation.
Nevertheless, due to the similar physical significance of the hyper-parameters β1, β2 ∈ [0, 1) in
LUTA and Adam, the performance of both algorithms largely remains insensitive to small changes to
the values of these parameters. Following [19], we fix β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 (line 1). We refer to
[19] for further details on the choice of these values for the gradient based stochastic optimization.
The gradient moment estimates in LUTA are exploited in stepping along the cost surface. Effective-
ness of the moments as stepping guides for stochastic optimization is already well-established [19],
[20]. Briefly ignoring the expression for ρ on line 10 of the algorithm, we compute this guide as the
ratio between the moment estimates υt√ωt , where the square-root accounts for ωt representing the
‘second’ moment. Note that, we slightly abuse the notation here as both values are vectors. On line 10,
we use the mathematically correct expression, where diag(.) converts a vector into a diagonal matrix,
or a diagonal matrix into a vector, and the inverse is performed element-wise. Another improvement
in line 10 is that we use the ‘bias-corrected’ ratio of the moment estimates instead. Moving averages
are known to get heavily biased at early iterations. This becomes a concern when the algorithm can
benefit from well-estimated initial points. In our experiments (§5), we also use LUTA in that manner.
Hence, bias-correction is accounted for in our technique. We provide a detailed derivation to arrive at
the expression on line 10 of Algorithm 1 in §A-1 of the supplementary material.
Let us compactly write ρ = υ˜t√
ω˜t
, where tilde indicates the bias-corrected vectors. It is easy to
see that for a large second moment estimate ω˜, ρ shrinks. This is desirable because we eventually
take a step along ρ, and a smaller step is preferable along the components that have larger variance.
The perturbation update step on line 11 of the algorithm further restricts ρ to unit `∞-norm. To an
extent, this relates to computing the gradient’s sign in FGSM [2]. However, most coefficients of ρ
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get restricted to smaller values in our case instead of ±1. As a side remark, we note that simply
computing the sign of ρ for perturbation update eventually nullifies the advantages of the second
moment estimate due to the squared terms. The `∞ normalization is able to preserve the required
direction in our case, while taking full advantage of the second moment estimate.
LUTA variants: As seen in Algorithm 1, LUTA accumulates the signals computed at each iteration.
To restrict the norm of the accumulated perturbation, `p-ball projection is used. The use of different
types of balls results in different variants of the algorithm. For the `∞-ball projection, we implement
Ψ(ρt) = sign(ρt)min (abs(ρt), η) on line 12. In the case of `2-ball projection, we use Ψ(ρt) =
min
(
1, η||ρt||2
)
ρt. These projections respectively bound the `∞ and `2 norms of the perturbations.
We bound these norms to reduce the perturbation’s perceptibility, which is in line with the existing
literature. However, we also employ a variant in which Ψ(ρt) = I(ρt), where I(.) is the identity
mapping. We refer to this particular variant as LUTA-U, for the ‘Unbounded’ perturbation norm. In
contrast to the typical use of perturbations in adversarial attacks, we employ LUTA-U perturbations
to explore the classification regions of the target model without restricting their norm. Owing to
the ‘label-universality’ of the perturbations, LUTA-U exploration promises to reveal interesting
information regarding the classification regions of the deep models.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate the proposed LUTA as an attack in § 5.1 and as an exploration tool in § 5.2. For the
latter, the unbounded version (LUTA-U) is used.
5.1 LUTA as attack
Setup: We first demonstrate the success of label-universal targeted fooling under LUTA by attack-
ing VGG-16 [8], ResNet-50 [9], Inception-V3 [10] and MobileNet-V2 [11] trained on ImageNet
dataset [12]. We use Keras provided public models, where selection of the networks is based on
their established performance and diversity. We use the training set of ILSVRC2012 for perturbation
estimation, whereas the validation set of this data (50 samples per class) is used as our test set. For
the non-source classes, we only use the correctly classified samples during training, with a lower
bound of 60% on the prediction confidence. This filtration is performed for computational purpose.
It still ensures useful gradient directions with fewer non-source samples. We do not filter the source
class data. We compute a perturbation using a two step strategy. First, we alter Algorithm 1 to
disregard the non-source class data. This is achieved by replacing the non-source class set S with the
source class set S and using ‘`target’ instead of ‘`’ for the gradient computation. In the second step,
we initialize LUTA with the perturbation computed in the first step. This procedure is also adopted
for computational gain under better initialization. In the first step, we let the algorithm run for 100
iterations, while ζ is set to 80% in the second step. We ensure at least 100 additional iterations in
the second step. We empirically set ‘b’ to 64 for the first step and 128 for the second. In the text to
follow, we discuss the setup details only when those are different from what is described here.
Besides fooling the ImageNet models, we also attack VGGFace model [13] (ResNet-50 architecture)
trained on the large-scale VGG-Face2 dataset [13]. In our experiments, Keras provided model
weights are used that are converted from the original Caffe implementation. We use the training set of
VGG-Face2 and crop the faces using the bounding box meta data. Random 50 images for an identity
are used as the test set, while the remaining images are used for perturbation estimation.
Fooling ImageNet models: We randomly choose ten source classes from ImageNet and make another
random selection of ten target labels, resulting in ten label transforming (i.e. fooling) experiments for
a single model. Both `∞ and `2-norm bounded perturbations are then considered, letting η = 15 and
4, 500 respectively. The ‘η’ values are chosen based on perturbation perceptibility.
We summarize the results in Table 1. Note that the reported fooling ratios are on ‘test’ data that is
previously unseen by both the targeted model and our algorithm. Successful fooling of the large-scale
models is apparent from the Table. The last column reports ‘Leakage’, which is defined as the average
fooling ratio of the non-source classes into the target label. Hence, lower Leakage values are more
desirable. It is worth mentioning that in a separate experiment where we alter our algorithm so that it
does not suppress fooling of the non-source classes, a significant rise in the Leakage was observed.
We provide results of that experiment in §A-2 of the supplementary material. Table 1 caption provides
the label information for the source→ target transformation employing the commonly used nouns.
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Bound Model T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 Avg. Leak.
`∞-norm
VGG-16 [8] 92 76 80 74 82 78 82 80 74 88 80.6±5.8 29.9
ResNet-50 [9] 92 78 80 72 76 84 78 76 82 78 79.6±5.4 31.1
Inception-V3 [10] 84 60 70 60 68 90 68 62 72 76 71.0±9.9 24.1
MobileNet-V2 [11] 92 94 88 78 88 86 74 86 84 94 86.4±6.5 37.1
`2-norm
VGG-16 [8] 90 84 80 84 94 86 82 92 86 96 87.4±5.3 30.4
ResNet-50 [9] 96 94 88 84 90 86 86 94 90 90 89.8±3.9 38.0
Inception-V3 [10] 86 68 62 62 74 72 74 68 66 76 70.8±7.2 45.6
MobileNet-V2 [11] 94 98 92 76 94 92 76 92 92 96 90.2±7.7 56.0
Table 1: Fooling ratios (%) with η = 15 for `∞ and 4, 500 for `2-norm bounded label-universal perturbations
for ImageNet models. The label transformations are as follows. T1: Airship→ School Bus, T2: Ostrich→
Zebra, T3: Lion→ Orangutang, T4: Bustard→ Camel, T5: Jelly Fish→ Killer Whale, T6: Life Boat→White
Shark, T7: Scoreboard→ Freight Car, T8: Pickelhaube→ Stupa, T9: Space Shuttle→ Steam Locomotive, T10:
Rapeseed→ Butterfly. Leakage (last column) is the average fooling of non-source classes into the target label.
Figure 1: Representative perturbations and adversarial images for `∞-bounded case, η = 15. Each
row shows perturbations for the same source → target fooling for the mentioned networks. An
adversarial example for a model is also shown for reference (on left), reporting the model confidence
on the target label. Following [1], the perturbations are visualized by 10x magnification, shifted by
128 and clamped to 0-255. Refer to §A-4 of the supplementary document for more examples.
We refer to §A-3 of the supplementary material for the exact labels and original WordNet IDs of the
ImageNet dataset.
In Fig. 1, we show perturbations for representative label foolings. The figure also presents a sample
adversarial example for each network. In our experiments, it was frequently observed that the models
show high confidence on the adversarial samples, as it is also clear from the figure. We provide further
images for both `∞ and `2-norm perturbations in §A-4 of the supplementary material. From the
images, we can see that the perturbations are often not easy to perceive by the Human visual system.
It is emphasized that this perceptibility and the fooling ratio in Table 1 is based on the selected ‘η’
values. Allowing larger ‘η’ results in even higher fooling ratios at the cost of larger perceptibility.
Fooling VGGFace model: We also test our algorithm for switching face identities in the large-scale
VGGFace model [13]. Table 2 reports the results on five identity switches that are randomly chosen
`∞-norm bounded `2-norm bounded
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Avg. Leak. F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 Avg. Leak.
88 76 74 86 84 81.6±6.2 1.9 76 80 78 76 84 78.8±3.3 1.8
Table 2: Switching face identities for VGGFace model on test set with LUTA (% fooling): The
switched identities in the original dataset are, F1: n000234→ n008779, F2: n000282→ n006494, F3:
n000314→ n007087, F4: n000558→ n001800, F5: n005814→ n006402. The `∞ and `2-norms of
the perturbation are upper bounded to 15 and 4,500 respectively.
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Figure 2: Representative face ID switching examples for VGGFace model. Sample clean target ID
image is provided for reference. Same setup as Table 2 is used. Perturbation visualization follows [1].
from the VGG-Face2 dataset. Considering the variety of expression, appearance, ambient conditions
etc. for a given subject in VGG-Face2, the results in Table 2 imply that LUTA enables an attacker to
change their identity on-the-fly with high probability, without worrying about the image capturing
conditions. Moreover, leakage of the target label to the non-source classes also remains remarkably
low. We conjecture that this happens because the target objects (i.e. faces) occupy major regions of the
images in the dataset, which mitigates the influence of identity-irrelevant information in perturbation
estimation, resulting in a more specific manipulation of the source to target conversion. Figure 2
illustrates representative adversarial examples resulting from LUTA for the face ID switches. Further
images can also be found in §A-5 of the supplementary material. The results demonstrate successful
identity switching on unseen images by LUTA.
5.2 LUTA-U as network autopsy tool
Keeping aside the success of LUTA as an attack, it is intriguing to investigate the patterns that
eventually change the semantics of a whole class for a network. For that, we let LUTA-U run
to achieve 100% test accuracy and observe the perturbation patterns. We notice a repetition of
the characteristic visual features of the target class in the perturbations thus created, see Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Patterns emergence with LUTA-U
achieving 100% test accuracy for German Shep-
hered → Ostrich. `2-norms of perturbations are
given. Clean samples are shown for reference.
Another observation we make is that multiple
runs of LUTA lead to different perturbations,
nevertheless, those perturbations preserve the
characteristic features of the target label. We
refer to §A-6 of the supplementary material for
the corroborating visualizations. Besides ad-
vancing the proposition that perturbations with
broader input domain are able to exploit geomet-
ric correlations between the decision boundaries
of the classifier [4], these observations also fore-
tell (possibly) non-optimization based targeted
fooling techniques in the future, where salient
visual features of the target class may be cheaply
embedded in the adversarial images.
Another interesting use of LUTA-U is in exploring the classification regions induced by the deep
models. We employ MobileNet-V2 [11], and let LUTA-U achieve 95% fooling rate on the training
samples in each experiment. We choose five ImageNet classes from Table 1 and convert their
labels into each other. We keep the number of training samples the same for each class, i.e. 965
as allowed by the dataset. In our experiment, the perturbation vector’s `2-norm is used as the
representative distance covered by the source class samples to cross over and stay in the target
class region. Experiments are repeated three times and the mean distances are reported in Table 3.
Interestingly, the differences between the distances for A→ B and B → A are significant. On the
other hand, we can see particularly lower values for ‘Airship’ and larger values for ‘School Bus’ for
all transformations. These observations are explainable under the hypothesis that w.r.t. the remaining
classes, the classification region for ‘Airship’ is more like a blob in the high dimensional space that
lets majority of the samples in it move (due to perturbation) more coherently towards other class
regions. On the other end, ‘School Bus’ occupies a relatively flat but well-spread region that is farther
from ‘Space Shuttle’ as compared to e.g. ‘Life Boat’.
LUTA makes the source class samples collectively move towards the target class region of a model
with perturbations. Hence, LUTA-U iterations also provide a unique opportunity to examine this
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Target→ Space Shuttle Steam Locomotive Airship School Bus Life Boat
Source ↓
Space Shuttle - 4364.4±81.1 4118.3±74.5 4679.4±179.5 5039.1±230.7
Steam Locomotive 5406.8±57.7 - 4954.7±56.5 5845.2±300.4 5680.2±40.0
Airship 3586.4±59.4 3992.7±291.1 - 3929.5±50.4 3937.8±33.7
School Bus 7448.8±200.9 6322.8±89.5 6586.8±165.1 - 5976.5±112.1
Life Boat 5290.4±43.1 5173.0±71.8 5121.5±154.1 5690.9±47.4 -
Table 3: Average `2-norms of the perturbations to achieve 95% fooling on MobileNet-V2 [11].
Figure 4: Max-label hopping during transformations using LUTA-U. Setup of Table 3 is employed.
migration through the classification regions. For the Table 3 experiment, we monitor the top-1
predictions during the iterations and record the maximally predicted labels (excluding the source
label) during training. In Fig. 4, we show this information as ‘max-label hopping’ for six representative
transformations. The acute observer will notice that both Table 3 and Fig. 4 consider ‘transportation
means’ as the source and target classes. This is done intentionally to illustrate the clustering of model
classification regions for semantically similar classes. Notice in Fig. 4, the hopping mostly involves
intermediate classes related to transportation/carriage means. Exceptions occur when ‘School Bus’ is
the target class. This confirms our hypothesis that this class has a well-spread region. Consequently,
it attracts a variety of intermediate labels as the target when perturbed, including those that live
(relatively) far from its main cluster.
Our analysis only scratches the surface of the model exploration and exploitation possibilities enabled
by LUTA, promising many interesting future research directions to which the community is invited.
5.3 Physical World attack
Label universal targeted attacks have serious implications if they transfer well to the Physical World.
To evaluate LUTA as the Physical World attack, we observe model label prediction on a live webcam
stream of the printed adversarial images. No enhancement/transformation is applied other than color
printing the adversarial images. This setup is considerably more challenging than e.g. fooling on
the digital scans of printed adversarial images [14]. Despite that, LUTA perturbations are found
surprisingly effective for label-universal fooling in the Physical World. The exact details of our
experiments are provided in §A-7 of the supplementary material. We also provide a video here,
capturing the live streaming examples.
5.4 Hyper-parameters and training time
In Algorithm 1, the desired fooling ratio ‘ξ’ controls the total number of iterations, given fixed
mini-batch size ‘b’ and ‘η’. Also, the mini-batch size plays its typical role in the underlying
Figure 5: Effects of varying ‘η’ on fooling ratio (left). Efficacy of
moments in optimization (right), η = 15 and 4500 for `∞ and `2.
stochastic optimization prob-
lem. Hence, we mainly focus
on the parameter ‘η’ in this
section. Fig. 5 (left) shows
the effects of varying ‘η’ on
the fooling ratios for the con-
sidered four ImageNet mod-
els for both `∞ and `2-norm
bounded perturbations. Only
the values of T1 are included
for clarity, as other transformations show qualitatively similar behavior. Here, we cut-off the training
after 200 iterations. The rise in fooling ratio with larger ‘η’ is apparent. On average, 100 iterations of
our Python 3 LUTA implementation requires 18.8, 20.9, 33.6 and 19.5 minutes for VGG-16, ResNet-
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50, Inception-V3 and MobileNet-V2 on NVIDIA Titan Xp GPU with 12 GB RAM using ‘b = 128’.
Fig. 5 (right) also illustrates the role of the first and second moments in achieving the desired fooling
rates more efficiently. For clarity, we show it for T1 for MobileNet-V2. Similar qualitative behavior
was observed in all our experiments. It is apparent that both moments significantly improve the
efficiency of LUTA by estimating the desired perturbation in fewer iterations. We use ξ = 99%
allowing at most 450 iterations.
6 Conclusion
We present the first of its kind attack that changes the label of a whole class into another label of choice.
Our white-box attack computes perturbations based on the samples of the source and non-source
classes, while stepping in the directions that are guided by the first two moments of the computed
gradients. The estimated perturbations are found to be effective for fooling large-scale ImageNet
and VGGFace models, while remaining largely imperceptible. We also show that the label-universal
perturbations are able to transfer well to the Physical World. The proposed attack is additionally
demonstrated to be an effective tool to empirically explore the classification regions of deep models,
revealing insightful modelling details. Moreover, LUTA perturbations exhibit interesting target label
patterns, which opens possibilities for their blackbox extensions.
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Supplementary Material
(Label Universal Targeted Attack)
A-1: Computing the bias corrected moments ratio
To derive the expression for the bias corrected moment ratio in Algorithm 1, we first focus on the moving average
expression of υt:
In υt = βυt−1 + (1− β)ξt, we ignore the subscript of ‘β1’ for clarity. We can write
at t = 1: υ1 = (1− β)ξ1,
at t = 2: υ2 = βυ1 + (1− β)ξ2 = (1− β)(β1ξ1 + β0ξ2),
at t = 3: υ3 = βυ2 + (1− β)ξ3 = (1− β)(β2ξ1 + β1ξ2 + β0ξ3), resulting in the expression:
υt = (1− β)
t∑
i=1
βt−iξi. (2)
Using Eq. (2), we can relate the Expected value of υt to the Expected value of the true first moment ξt as
follows:
E[υt] = E
[
(1− β)
t∑
i=1
βt−iξi
]
= E[ξt] (1− β)
t∑
i=1
βt−1 + , (3)
where  → 0 for the value of ‘β’ assigning very low weights to the more distant time stamps in the past
(e.g. β ≥ 0.9). Ignoring ‘’, the remaining expression gets simplified to:
E[υt] = E[ξt](1− βt). (4)
Simplification of Eq. (3) to Eq. (4) is verifiable by choosing a small value of ‘t’ and expanding the former. In
Eq. (4), the term (1 − βt) causes a bias for a larger β ∈ [0, 1) and smaller t, which is especially true for the
early iterations of the algorithm. Hence, to account for the bias, υ˜t = υt(1−β1)t must be used instead of directly
employing υt. Analogously, we can correct the bias for ωt by using ω˜t = ωt(1−β2)t .
Since ω˜t denotes the moving average of bias corrected second moment estimate, we use the ratio
υ˜t√
ω˜t
=
υt√
ωt
√
1− β2
1− β1 . (5)
Considering that υt and ωt are vectors in Eq. (5), we re-write the above as the following mathematically
meaningful expression:
ρ =
υ˜t√
ω˜t
=
√
1− βt2
1− βt1
diag
(
diag(
√
ωt)
−1υt
)
, (6)
where diag(.) forms a diagonal matrix of the vector in its argument or forms a vector of the diagonal matrix
provided to it. The inverse in the above equation is element-wise.
A-2: Label leakage suppression in LUTA
To demonstrate the effect of leakage suppression using non-source classes, we perform the following experiment.
In Algorithm 1, we replace the set S of the non-source classes with set S of the source class samples, and use
‘`target’ instead of ‘`’ to compute the gradients. This removes any role the non-source classes play in the original
LUTA. Under the identical setup as for Table 1 of the paper, we observe the following average percentage
Leakage ‘rise’ for the perturbations. VGG-16: 18.5%, ResNet-50: 21.9%, Inception-V3: 63.6% and MobileNet-
V2: 26.7%. On the other hand, the changes in the fooling ratios on the test data are not significant. Concretely,
the average test data fooling ratio changes are, VGG-16: −1.2%, ResNet-50: −0.4%, Inception-V3: +5.2%,
and MobileNet-V2: −5.2%. Here, ‘−’ indicates that the fooling ratio on the test set actually decreases when
label leakage is not suppressed. Conversely, ‘+’ indicates a gain, which occurs only in the case of Inception-V3.
However, the label leakage rise for the same network is also the maximum. This experiment conclusively
demonstrates the successful label leakage suppression by the original algorithm.
11
A-3: Label details for ImageNet model fooling
For the labels used in Table 1 of the paper, Table 4 provides the detailed names and WordNet IDs.
Transformation ImageNet Label WordNet ID
T1 source: airship, dirigible n02692877
target: school bus n04146614
T2 source: ostrich, Struthio camelus n01518878
target: zebra n02391049
T3 source: lion, king of beasts, Panthera leo n02129165
target: orangutan, orang, orangutang, Pongo pygmaeus n02480495
T4 source: bustard n02018795
target: Arabian camel, dromedary, Camelus dromedarius n02437312
T5 source: jellyfish n01910747
target: killer whale, killer, orca, ..., Orcinus orca n02071294
T6 source: lifeboat n03662601
target: great white shark, white shark, man-eater, ..., carc1harias n01484850
T7 source: scoreboard n04149813
target: freight car n03393912
T8 source: pickelhaube n03929855
target: stupa, tope n04346328
T9 source: space shuttle n04266014
target: steam locomotive n04310018
T10 source: rapeseed n11879895
target: sulphur butterfly, sulfur butterfly n02281406
Table 4: Detailed labels and WordNet IDs of ImageNet for Table 1 of the paper.
A-4: Further illustrations of perturbations for ImageNet model fooling
Fig. 6 shows further examples of `∞-norm bounded perturbations with ‘η = 15’. We also show `2-norm
bounded perturbation examples in Fig. 7 and 8.
Figure 6: `∞-norm bounded perturbations with ‘η = 15’. A row contains perturbations for the
same source→ target fooling. Representative adversarial samples are also shown. We follow [1] for
visualizing the perturbation. The perturbations are generally hard to perceive for humans.
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Figure 7: `2-norm bounded perturbations with ‘η = 4, 500’.
Figure 8: Further examples of `2-norm bounded perturbations with ‘η = 4, 500’.
13
A-5: Further images of face identity switches:
Figure 9: Representative `∞ and `2-norm bounded perturbations for face identity switching on
VGGFace model. Example clean images of the target classes are provided for reference only.
A-6: Perturbation patterns:
With different LUTA runs for the same source→ target transformations, we achieve different perturbations due
to stochasticity introduced by the mini-batches. However, all those perturbations preserve the characteristic
visual features of the target class. Fig. 10 illustrates this fact. The shown perturbations are for VGG-16. We
choose this network for more clear target class patterns in the perturbations. This phenomenon is generic for the
models. However, for more complex models, regularities are relatively harder to perceive. Fig. 11 provides few
more VGG-16 perturbation examples in which visual appearance of the target classes are clear.
Figure 10: Multiple runs of LUTA result in different perturbation patterns. However, each patterns
contains the dominant visual features of the target class. Clean samples are shown for reference only.
Figure 11: Further examples of perturbations for VGG-16. Distinct visual features of the target class
are apparent in the perturbation patterns.
14
A-7: LUTA in the Physical World:
Label-universal targeted fooling has a challenging objective of mapping a large variety of inputs to a single
(incorrect) target label. Considering that, a straightforward extension of this attack to the Physical World seems
hard. However, our experiments demonstrate that label-universal targeted fooling is achievable in the Physical
World using the adversarial inputs computed by the proposed LUTA.
To show the network fooling in the Physical World, we adopt the following settings. A 224× 224 image (from
ImageNet) is expanded to the maximum allowable area of A4-size paper in the landscape mode. We perform the
expansion with a commonly used image organizing software designed for personal photo management for the
GNOME desktop environment, ‘Shotwell’ (click here for more details on the software). The software choice is
random, and we prefer a common software because an actual attacker may also use something similar. After
the expansion, we print the image on a plain A4 paper using the commercial bizhub-c458 color printer from
Konica-Minolta. Default printer setting is used in our experiments. We use the same settings to print both clean
and adversarial images. The printed images are shown to a regular laptop webcam and its live video stream is
fed to our target model that runs on Matlab 2018b using the ‘deep learning toolbox’. We use VGG-16 for this
experiment. We use a square 720× 720 grid for the video to match our square images. Note that, we are directly
fooling a classifier here (no detector), hence the correct aspect ratio of the image is important in our case.
In the video we provide here, it is clear that the perturbations are able to fool the model into the desired target
labels quite successfully. For this experiment, we intentionally selected those adversarial images in which
the perturbations were relatively more perceptible, as they must be visible to the webcam (albeit slightly) to
take effect. Nevertheless, all the shown images use η = 15 for the underlying `∞-norm bounded perturba-
tions. Perceptibility of the same perturbation can be different for different images, based on image properties
(e.g. brightness, contrast). For the images where the perturbation perceptibiltiy is low for the Physical World
attack, a simple scaling of the perturbation works well (instead of allowing larger η in the algorithm). However,
we do not show any such case in the provided video. All the used image perturbations are directly computed for
η = 15.
It is also worth mentioning that a Physical World attack setup similar to [14] was also tested in our experiments,
where instead of a live video stream, we classify digitally scanned and cropped adversarial images (originally
printed in the same manner as described above). However, for the tested images with quasi-imperceptible
perturbations (with η = 15), 100% successful fooling was observed. Hence, that setup was not deemed
interesting enough to be reported. Our current setup is more challenging because it does not assume static,
perfectly cropped, uniformly illuminated and absolutely plane adversarial images. These assumptions are
implicit in the other setup.
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